In this paper we continue to develop indicator that determines the quality of the interaction regions with natural monopolies. Is considered a generalized example of interaction in which the work is carried out simultaneously on several projects. In an apparent form obtained formalization index interaction to connect the two projects. Indicated by the upper and lower bounds of efficiency for mixed projects
Introduction
Let's proceed directly to development and economic and mathematical formalization of the interaction index between the natural monopoly and a region for a general case of parallel implementation the projects which belong to an approved (fixed) complex regional development program. For the special case model was built and tested in the works [1, 2] .
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The Here T is the program duration (range of planning) expressed trough the number of reporting units (time periods) of the covering perspective (for instance, 10 years).
There is a value ‫ܦ‬ ୭୰ୣୡୟୱ୲
in the numerator. ‫ܦ‬ ୭୰ୣୡୟୱ୲
is predicted average income of the natural monopoly per unit of time from the project Π implementation (implemented separately from other projects). Income from investments, inflationary processes, the natural monopoly profit from the project Π results (increase of traffic volumes and loading and unloading volumes and etc.) are considered in this value. A formula and a method of ‫ܦ‬ ୭୰ୣୡୟୱ୲
determination are given in [3, 4] . is the averaged possible volume of the company's ܲ saved funds per unit of time which would be saved by company in the case of total rejection from the receivables investment activity in the frames of the Π project with nodes-enterprises of the region.
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Introduction interaction index of interdependent projects
The main idea to define and calculate an interaction index of interdependent (dependent from each other) projects is their model merger, i.e. hypothetical combination of the group of depended projects in the one vertical (no longer elementary) tube of the regional sandwich-model [1, 2] . Further arguments are based on similar principles to [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Let's describe and demonstrate a procedure of the model merger of interdependent projects on the easiest example. This example is implementation the pair of projects Π and Π ೕ , and implementation of the favorable for the natural monopoly project Π ೕ is dependent from implementation of the unattractive project Π It is obvious that one can calculate a new effectiveness ratio for a similar joint project Π ೕ using a general method of determination the isolated projects effectiveness ratios The ݇ ೕ is an interaction index of the joint projects Π and Π ೕ .
Let's note that in fact, according to the developed calculation method, the coefficient ݇ ೕ is calculated independently from the values of the effectiveness ratios ݇ and ݇ ೕ for each project separately because new initial data is used to determine the value ݇ ೕ and the values ݇ and ݇ ೕ do not participate in the formula for defining ݇ ೕ . Indeed, total volumes of investments to both projects and incomes from loans and their time distribution become different, the natural monopoly benefit from projects aftereffects is distributed among two projects, probable company's income from placement investments on bank deposits changes and etc. Actually, all factors, taken into account when the effectiveness ratio is calculated and involved to its analytical mathematical expression, change. , which can interpreted as the ratio of the alternative income to the real income of the project Π implementation (i.e. the bigger this ratio is, the less attractive project Π is).
It is evident that when a pair of projects Π and Π ೕ mergers to the one joint project Π ೕ in the simplest case of the projects interdependence (i.e. there are no additional links between the projects increasing or decreasing projects profitability in the case of their joint implementation), there is merger of their real profitable parts: ‫ܦ‬ ೕ ൌ ‫ܦ‬ ‫ܦ‬ ೕ , and alternative profitable parts: ‫ݐ݈ܣ‬ ೕ ൌ ‫ݐ݈ܣ‬ ‫ݐ݈ܣ‬ ೕ . Hence, the effectiveness ratio of interaction in the joint project Π ೕ is the following (qualitative form):
, and the extent of the joint project uselessness (a value inverse to the effectiveness ratio) is:
Generalization index of the economic interaction effectiveness
1227
It is evident that the worsening summand that increases the extent of the project Π ೕ uselessness is a value
e. a ratio of the both projects total alternative income to the real income of the projects.
Let's consider a situation (which is very typical for real situation) when implementation the attaching of the influencing unattractive for the natural monopoly project and a low-income project Π is imposed to the natural monopoly instead of implementation the beneficial and highly-profitable project Π . In this case ݇ ೕ ݇ and at the same time the effectiveness ratio is very close to zero ݇ ൎ 0 from the natural monopoly point of view. ݇ ൌ ା௧ ൎ 0, therefore the real income of the unattractive project is close to zero ‫ܦ‬ ൎ 0 because in the case of any project implementation cancelling the alternative income is always non-negative ‫ݐ݈ܣ‬ 0.
To clarify the further conclusions one should imagine the limiting case ‫ܦ‬ ൌ 0 when the real income of unattractive imposed project Π is zero. In this limiting case the qualitative expressions to the effectiveness ratio ݇ ೕ and the extent of uselessness of the joint project ψ ೕ is:
It shows that the worsening summand (when unattractive project Π is joint to the effective project Π ౠ ) is the value
, which presents ratio of the possible alternative income from the joint unattractive project Π to the real expected income from the highly-effective project Π ౠ .
There is an obvious and essential inequality from a practical point of view which ensures from the written expression for the extent of the joint project Π ೕ uselessness (in the case of ratio ݇ ೕ ݇ for the efficiencies of the joint projects):
-the effectiveness ratio of the joint project Π ೕ is always lower than the efficiency of the most profitable project Π ౠ merger of the projects increases efficiency of the unattractive project Π .
Conclusion
It is obvious that the determined effectiveness ratio of the joint projects at the merger of projects solves the problem mentioned at the beginning of this article because its value takes into consideration influence of the projects to each other in the case of conditionality one project (profitable) by another (unattractive). Such method of the interaction index determination gives more weight to unattractive projects required to be implemented only for implementation of cost-effective point of the regional program. At the same time merger with unattractive project decreases effectiveness ratio of the profitable project, therefore one should understand that accepting a large number of unattractive points of regional program can significantly decrease an overall interaction index of its interaction in this region. Extent of possible reduction of the joint projects interaction index of the regional program (extent of possible concessions in negotiations) has to be determined by economic and in some cases political expediency.
There is one more important conclusion from the analysis of effectiveness ratio behavior at the merger of interrelated projects. When projects merge to the one joint regional program, the worsening summand, which decreases the integrated effectiveness ratio, are ratios ௧ ೕ of probable alternative income from the joining unattractive projects Π to the real income from highly-effective projects Π ౠ . Hence, there is a strategic direction of negotiations and the whole agreement process when regional programs are developed and approved: in order to increase effectiveness of the natural monopoly interaction in the region it is necessary to achieve the decrease of ratios 
